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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to identify the duty of care that applies to ‘professionally classified clients’
based on the recently implemented Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) as well as the
previous Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I (MiFID I). The authors place critical notes on the
effectiveness of someMiFID provisions.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors have reviewed the Delegated Acts of MiFID I and II, as
well as Q&A’s of the European Regulator, ESMA and jurisprudence. The authors aim to add value by
facilitating a discussion on the effectiveness of applicable MiFID provisions.
Findings – This review of the legal provisions provides researchers and practitioners in the investment
sectors with a clear overview of the legal provisions detailing how these provisions should be met and how
improvements to the provisions can be achieved.
Practical implications – This paper specifies what the provisions for professional classified clients are
and facilitates a discussion on the effectiveness of these provisions.
Originality/value – Addressing the legal provisions which are applicable to ‘professional classified
clients’ that derive fromMiFID I and II and includes a critical analysis which offers an original perspective.
Keywords Effectiveness, Duty of care, Professional, MiFID II, Banking regulation, Investor
Paper type Technical paper
Introduction
The implementation of both European investment directive Markets in the Financial
Instruments Directive I and II (MiFID) has affected a large number of investment services.
To strengthen investor confidence and to raise investor protection, extensive transaction
reporting, product approval provisions and investor protection provisions[1] are been
implemented. With regard to investor protection, legislation is particularly focused on ‘retail
clients’ (also referred to as ‘non professional clients’), as the duty of care required for these
clients is considered the most extensive. Although MiFID II does not contain a large number
of relevant new investor protection obligations for professional classified clients, under
MiFID I, the obligations remain comprehensive and attempt to improve the position of the
professional investor.
What are these provisions under MiFID and are these provisions effective? These two
questions shall be answered in this paper. In the first section, we shall provide a definition of
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aims to provide a clear overview of the MiFID provisions with regard to professional clients[2].
We shall conclude by commenting on these MiFID provisions. These comments are made from
both an academic and empirical perspective to stimulate a discussion on the effectiveness of
these provisions. It is hoped that this discussion will contribute to the evaluation of the
provisions by the EU Council and EU Parliament in 2021.
Definition and classification of ‘professional client’: Dutch legal history contains several
definitions of ‘professional client’. For example, a distinction in the Dutch Financial
Supervision Act is made between ‘professional client’ and ‘professional market party’. The
latter may be a qualified investor, a subsidiary of a qualified investor that is involved in the
supervision on a consolidated basis on the qualified investor or any other person or
company designated as a professional market party.
Under MiFID, the classification of clients in either retail clients, professional clients or
eligible counterparties is mandatory. It is compulsory to inform the client about its
classification, which should take place before financial services being provided. The way in
which the investment firm classifies a client ultimately determines the level of client protection
that the client enjoys and, thus, what provisions under MiFID apply to the investment firm,
where the first category enjoys the most client protection and the latter, the least protection.
There are two types of professional classification. One is considered to be a ‘professional
client per se’ according to theMiFID directive[3], if the following conditions are met:
(1) entities which are required to be authorized or regulated to operate in the financial
markets such as credit institutions, investment firms, insurance companies,
collective investment schemes and pension funds;
(2) large undertakings meeting two of the following size criteria (on a company basis):
 a balance sheet total of e20,000,000;
 a net turnover of e40,000,000; and
 possessing own funds of e2,000,000.
(3) national and regional governments, including public bodies that manage public
debt at national or regional level, central banks, international and supranational
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the ECB; and
(4) other institutional clients whose main activity is to invest in financial instruments,
including entities dedicated to the securitization of assets or other financing
transactions.
Under certain conditions, it is permitted to classify retail clients as professional (so-called
‘opt-up professionals’), in which case a qualitative and quantitative assessment should be
done. During the quantitative assessment, a minimum of two of the following criteria[4]
must be met:
 The client has carried out transactions of ‘significant’ size, on the relevant market at
an average frequency of 10 transactions per quarter over the previous four quarters.
 The size of the client’s financial instrument portfolio, defined as including cash
deposits and financial instruments, exceeds e500,000.
 The client works or has worked in the financial sector for at least one year in a
professional position, which requires (or required) knowledge of the transactions or
services envisaged.
If this quantitative assessment is passed, then the expertise, experience and knowledge of






























should provide reasonable assurance, in light of the nature of the transactions or services
envisaged, that the client is capable of making sound investment decisions and
understanding the risks involved.
It is possible for the professional client to request to be treated as a retail client, either in
general or per transaction or service. It is at the discretion of the investment firm to agree to
this request. If the investment firm agrees, then the client can rely on the higher level of
investor protection that applies to retail clients. If the client is classified as a professional
client, then it is his responsibility to request a higher level of protection if he does not
consider himself able to adequately assess or manage the risks involved. Professional clients
are also responsible for informing the investment firm of any change in circumstances
which could affect their categorization. However, should the investment firm itself become
aware that the client no longer fulfils the initial ‘professional classification conditions’,
appropriate action must be taken. An example of this is when the investment firm becomes
aware or should have known that the size of its client’s investment portfolio has fallen below
the e500,000 threshold which was one of the criteria based on which the client could opt up
for a professional client status.
When it comes to client classification, MiFID II brings a substantial change to one
component: the classification of local authorities such as provinces and municipalities,
which may have ‘opted up’ to a professional client status.
The ‘professionals’mentioned below have suffered substantial losses. In the light of these
types of occurrences, it was decided under MiFID II to allowMember States to adopt specific
criteria for the assessment of the expertise and knowledge of municipalities and local public
authorities requesting to be treated as professional clients[5].
In Italy between 2001 and 2008, local authorities entered into approximately 1,000 interest rate
swaps with a value of e35bn representing the equivalent of about one third of all debts of Italian
regions, provinces and local authorities. The Bank of Italy calculated that the losses had risen to
approximately e1bn. For example, the City of Milan has litigated against four banks that stand
trial for aggravated fraud over an interest swap on a e1.68bn bond issue. The swap caused
substantial losses, with the banks being accused of raising e101mn in hidden fees.
In December 1994, Orange County, a prosperous district in California, was declared bankrupt.
This was the result of substantial losses of approximately US$1.6bn incurred by the investment
pools intended to manage the Orange County cash flows and those of 241 associated local
government entities. The investment pool was managed by the treasurer, Robert Citron, who
controlled the investment pool. He had invested the pooled funds in a leveraged portfolio of
mainly interest-linked securities. His investment strategy depended on low interest rates.
However, as from February 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank began to raise US interest rates,
causing many securities in Orange County’s investment pool to fall in value which resulted
ultimately in the aforementioned losses. Citron had been a treasurer for 22 years and, because of
his long track record, was considered to be a professional with a large amount of knowledge and
experience.
KYC provisions on professional clients
When it comes to Know Your Customer (KYC) provisions, the investment firm is faced with
a multitude of provisions that must be complied with. For example, intended transactions by
a retail client must be tested for appropriateness and/or suitability by the investment firm.
These tests are less significant and impactful for professional clients mainly because of the

































Under MiFID, a number of presumptions are permitted with regard to a professional
client. Where an investment firm, as part of the appropriateness or suitability test, carefully
assesses and records the investment experience and knowledge of a retail client; this
exercise is not mandatory for professional clients. With regard to the professional classified
clients, it may be assumed that they have the necessary experience and knowledge to
understand the risks involved of particular investment services or transactions or types of
transaction or product, for which the client is classified as a professional client[6].
Furthermore, the investment firm may assume that the per se professional client is
financially able to bear any related investment risks consistent with its investment
objectives. As a result, the investment firm is generally not required to obtain financial
information on the professional client. However, according to ESMA, this only seems to
apply to investment advice services. In some cases where the client’s investment objectives
demand it, for example, if the client requires an investment product for hedging purposes,
then information of the financial position will need to be obtained[7]. The reason for such is
to be able to propose an effective hedging instrument. When it comes to portfolio
management, it seems that an inventory will have to be done to assess the ability to bear
losses related to investment risks[8]. This includes, if and when applicable, obtaining
information on the source and extent of regular income, assets (including liquid assets),
investments and real estate and regular financial commitments[9].
In The Netherlands, as a result of inter alia the ‘Vestia case’, housing corporations may by law
only enter into financial derivatives if the corporation is classified as a retail client. Vestia is a
housing corporation that entered into interest rate derivatives with a number of banks. As a result
of changing market conditions the market value of its derivatives portfolio amounted to
approximately e3bn in negative value which almost resulted in the bankruptcy of Vestia at the
end of 2011 before the Dutch State intervention. The losses actually suffered by Vestia amounted
to approximately e2bn. Given the size of the housing corporation, Vestia could be classified as a
per se professional client under MiFID. In 2011, it appeared that up to 87 per cent of all Dutch
housing corporations could indeed be classified as per se professional client under MiFID. The
consequence thereof was that housing corporations did not benefit from the investor protection
rules afforded under MiFID for retail clients. A number of banks did not consider Vestia a client to
which it provided an investment service but considered Vestia a counterparty to the interest rate
swap contract. Accordingly, as one the measures to reduce unnecessary losses, the Minister of
Internal Affairs stipulated that government regulated housing corporations may only enter into
certain derivatives transactions for hedging purposes if the investment firm classifies the housing
corporation as a retail client.
Furthermore, the investment objectives of the professional client have to be obtained and
recorded when providing investment advice or portfolio management. The information
regarding the investment objectives of the professional client must include, if and when
applicable, the investment horizon, the preferences regarding risk-taking, the risk profile
and the purpose of the investment[10].
Information obligations towards professional clients
As described above, not only does MiFID require an investment firm to classify a client, but
also requires that the client should be informed about his or her (re)classification in writing.
Case law in The Netherlands has taught that not informing the client of his or her (re)
classification may not only result in a breach of a regulatory requirement but it may also have
civil law consequences. In an extra-judicial court hearing, it was decided that although the
financial institution (in casu ‘Hanzevast’) may rightfully have classified the client as a






























client enjoyed the protection of a retail client. This resulted in the verdict that the client was able
to claim part of the damages suffered.
In general, under MiFID, the core information obligations imposed upon investment firms
are similar for both professional and retail clients. All information is subject to the main
principle, meaning that any and all information provided to clients should be “fair, clear and
not misleading”[11]. This makes sense, as there should be no reason why application of this
principle should vary depending on the type of clients.
However, MiFID acknowledges that the information provided to a client should take into
account the status of such client as either a retail, professional or eligible counterparty. As a
result, less stringent information obligations may apply to professional clients[12].
The main rule is that investment firms must provide the (compulsory) pre-contractual
information in good time[13]. This relates to, for example, contact details of the investment
firm, the specific investment services and ancillary services the investment firm provides, its
conflict of interest policy and specific information related to portfolio management if and
when provided by the investment firm.
Nonetheless, the Dutch Supreme Court in the ‘World Online’ prospectus liability case seemed, to
some extent, to indicate otherwise although more in the context of whether or not it is likely
whether a professional client may base its investment decision on information which may
potentially be misleading in comparison to the retail client. In this case, investors claimed
damages from World Online and a syndicate of banks because of incorrect and potentially
misleading information contained in the prospectus. The Supreme Court considered that in the
case of a professional client, rather than a retail client, it could be argued that despite the presence
of misleading information in the prospectus, the investment decision of a professional client is
likely not to be influenced by that misleading information.
When providing pre-contractual information, one must ensure that the manner of
communication is in line with the investment firm’s general way of communication. In
addition to compulsory pre-contractual information, investment firms also provide non-
mandatory pre-contractual information to prospective clients. Such information,
normally labelled as ‘marketing’, is, under MiFID, subject to certain conditions. For
example, the marketing information should always give a fair and prominent indication
of any relevant risks simultaneously with information concerning the potential benefits
of an investment service or financial instrument[14]. Furthermore, the marketing
information should use a font size in the indication of relevant risks section that is at
least equal to the predominant font size used throughout the information provided, as
well as a layout ensuring the prominence of such indication[15]. This requirement
basically prohibits presenting risks in a font smaller than the predominant size used in
the marketing material text. In addition, all information and marketing materials must
be consistently presented in the same language throughout, unless the client has agreed
to receive information in more than one language[16].
MIFID does not appear to differentiate between marketing information provided to retail
clients or professional clients. However, in its advice to the Commission, ESMA made an
explicit distinction between information provided to retail clients or professional clients.
ESMA indicated that “Information addressed to or likely to be received by professional
clients or potential professional clients:
 shall not reference any potential benefits of an investment service or financial

































 shall not disguise, diminish or obscure important items, statements or warnings;
and
 shall be accurate and up-to-date, relevant to the method of communication used”[17].
Unlike for retail clients, ESMAwas not of the opinion that requirements as to the font size in
the indication of relevant risks and to the consistent use of the same language throughout all
forms of information and marketing materials should be applicable to professional clients.
The question arises whether one can assume that this approach by ESMA may still be
interpreted as an elaboration of the principle that it is appropriate to establish less stringent
specific information requirements with respect to professional clients than to retail clients.
In practice, it is arguable that this is the case.
Information on financial instruments
Pursuant to MiFID, investment firms are obliged to provide information on financial
instruments. Such information relates particularly to the nature, characteristics, functioning,
performance of and risks associated with financial instruments. The description of risks
may include inter alia risks related to leverage and its effects, the insolvency of the issuer or
the volatility of the price of such instruments and illiquidity risks. Information should be
clear enough for the retail or professional client to base their investment decision upon it.
The level of detail of the information to be provided on such financial instrument may,
however, vary depending on whether this concerns a retail client or a professional client[18].
First, one assumes that the level of detail of the wording used, particularly the language
and complexity of investment terminology, may be different for retail clients compared to
professional clients. An example where ESMA expresses a difference between product
information which needs to be provided to retail clients vis à vis professional clients are
financial products that fall under the PRIIPs-regulation[19]. PRIIPs relates to packaged
retail investment and insurance products, such as complex structured products and
derivatives. Given the complexity of such products, the PRIIPs regulation obliges those who
produce or sell investment products to provide (only) retail clients with key information
documents (KIDs) on such products. A KID on a PRIIPs product is a document with a
maximum of three pages and provides clear information on a particular investment product.
Second, there is a presumption that professional clients, as opposed to retail clients, are more
capable of understanding the information provided. Professional clients are in addition also
in a better position to ask specific questions regarding such information or to obtain advice
from other (external) parties.
Information on bundled products
MiFID II requires that when an investment service is offered together with another service
or product as part of a package or as a condition for the same agreement or package, the
investment firm shall inform the client whether it is possible to buy the different
components separately and shall provide for a separate evidence of the costs and charges of
each component[20]. This is referred to as a ‘bundled product’. Where such bundled product
is offered to a retail client, MiFID II requires that where the risks resulting from such an
agreement or package are likely to be different from the risks associated with the
components taken separately, the investment firm needs to provide an adequate description
of the different components of the agreement or package and the way which interaction
modifies the risks. This additional information obligation does not apply to professional
clients presumably in the understanding that professional clients are able to appreciate the






























Examples of bundled products are security-based credits or a credit facility combined with
an interest rate swap to hedge interest rate risks.
Information on costs and associated charges
Under MiFID II, the investment firm’s obligations to disclose information on all costs and
charges to clients are increased. Such increased costs transparency relates to inter alia the
obligation imposed upon the investment firm to provide an aggregated overview of all of the
expected costs to the client before providing any services (‘ex-ante costs disclosure’). Such
aggregated costs disclosure relates to[21]:
 the costs of the services, both investment services and ancillary services; and
 the costs of the financial instruments, for example ongoing costs and charges of
investment funds.
Clients with whom the investment firm has an ongoing relationship must be provided at
least once a year with information of the total costs and charges actually incurred for both
the services and the financial instruments (‘ex-post disclosure’).
Such transparency obligations are also extended to investment services provided to
professional clients and eligible counterparties. Nonetheless, under MiFID, investment firms
are permitted, when providing investment services to professional clients, to agree with
these clients to limit the detailed requirements set out in the regulation. In that respect,
information on costs and charges to professional clients may be different compared to those
to retail clients. There are, however, situations where an investment firm cannot agree
otherwise with the client. This is the case:
 when an investment firm renders investment advice or portfolio management
services; or
 where irrespective of the investment service provided, the financial instruments
concerned embeds a derivative[22].
In such cases, therefore, the level of detail of the information obligations are identical to both
retail and professional clients.
As well as the investment firms’ obligations to disclose information on all costs and
charges to clients, the investment firm is obliged to provide an illustration showing the
cumulative effect of costs on the investment return[23]. Again, investment firms may agree,
upon the request of the professional clients, not to provide such illustration. The same
applies for the obligation to provide information, where relevant, on the currency involved
and the applicable conversion rates and costs where any part of the total costs and charges
is expressed in foreign currency.
Information on best execution policy
Investment firms are obliged to take adequate measures to obtain the best possible result
when executing the client’s orders. This obligation is also referred to as the ‘best-execution’-
obligation. In the effort to obtain the best possible result for clients, investment firms need to
take into account various factors such as security price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution
and settlement, size, nature or any other aspect relevant to the execution of the order[24].
MiFID provides that one of the factors that should be taken into account are the
characteristics of the client including the categorization of the client as retail or professional.
Furthermore, MiFID provides that when an investment firm executes an order on behalf of a
































representing the price of the financial instrument and the costs relating to execution. For
professional clients, other factors, that is, other than the total consideration, may be equally
or even more relevant for obtaining the best possible result[25].
The measures to obtain the best possible result when executing the client’s orders are
normally also reflected in the information on the order execution policy of the investment
firm. Under MiFID, there are several differences between providing information on the
execution policy to retail clients as opposed to professional clients. First, where an
investment firm executes orders for retail clients, it is obliged to provide those clients with a
summary of the relevant policy, focused primarily on the total costs they incur[26]. Second,
investment firms are required as an ongoing obligation to summarize and to publish on an
annual basis, for each class of financial instruments, the top five execution venues in terms
of trading volumes where client orders have been executed in the preceding year and
information on the quality of execution obtained. MiFID II distinguishes, in terms of the
format that needs to be published, between such information to be provided to retail clients
and to professional clients[27].
Inducements regime
The main principle under MiFID is that investment firms when they are providing
investment services and/or ancillary services to its clients must act “honestly, fairly and
professionally in accordance with the best interests of their clients”[28]. A subset of this
principle relates to the MiFID II inducements regime. The inducements regime under MiFID
II stipulates that investment firms paying (or being paid) any fee or commission or
providing or being provided with any non-monetary benefit in connection with the provision
of their investment services or ancillary services to the client should ensure that such
payment or benefit:
 is designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client; and
 does not impair compliance with the firm’s duty to act honestly, fairly and
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients[29].
MiFID II provides that in certain circumstances, the investment firm is prohibited from
receiving such third-party fees, unless it transfers such fee or commission in full to its
client[30]. This is the case with regard to the portfolio management and independent
investment advice services.
With regard to inducements, MiFID II does not differentiate between the types of client.
However, in some member states within the EU, this distinction has been made depending on
the type of clients. This distinction was made possible because MiFID created ‘a member state
option’ facilitating a deviation from the main rule laid down in MiFID. In The Netherlands, for
example, the MiFID regime is applicable where the investment firm provides investment
services to professional clients. However, The Netherlands have implemented a full
inducements ban when investment services are provided to retail clients, which ban goes
beyond the restrictions of MiFID I and II. More in particular, where the investment firm
provides investment services to retail clients, including independent investment advice or
execution only services, the receipt of third-party fees by such investment firm is prohibited,
even if the investment firm is willing to transfer such inducements in full to its clients.
Reporting of losses
Under MiFID II, it is mandatory for the investment firm to report, in relation to managed






























portfolio declines with 10 per cent (or more) in the reporting period, it must be reported at the
latest at the end of the business day in which the threshold is exceeded. This obligation also
applies to all clients of the investment firm. However, there is an additional obligation to
report a 10 per cent decrease in leveraged financial instruments or contingent liability
transactions to retail clients which is not mandatory for professional clients.
Product governance
Under MiFID II, product governance requirements have been introduced to ensure that
investment firms which manufacture and/or distribute investment products or financial
instruments act in the clients’ best interests during the life-cycle of the financial products or
investment services. MiFID II creates separate obligations for investment firms that
manufacture financial instruments and investment firms that distribute financial
instruments.
An investment firm qualifies as a manufacturer if the activity involves the creation,
development, issuance or design of that product. A distributing investment firm refers to a
firm that offers, recommends or sells an investment product and service to a client.
Furthermore, investment firms, both manufacturers and distributors, need to have a
product governance arrangement and product review process in place. One of the most
important product governance requirements under MiFID II is that the investment firm
should assess the target market of investment products distributed to its client. The
investment firm, therefore, needs to ensure that its distribution strategy is in line with
the target market of investment products distributed via the relevant investment services
the firm offers. Product governance requirements under MiFID II apply irrespective of the
nature of the client. However, the outcome of the product governance process may vary
depending on whether an investment firm manufactures and/or distributes investment
products to professional clients or to retail clients. This results from the following factors:
First, some investment services or transactions are not appropriate for retail clients. MIFID
II provides that certain arrangements may not be offered to retail clients at all. This
concerns title transfer financial collateral arrangements (TTCA’s) for the purpose of
securing or covering present or future, actual or contingent or prospective obligations of
clients. In addition, and more importantly, a number of investment products are eligible for
professional clients only. ESMA indicated in its guidelines that some products, in particular
investment products that have complex risk profiles, for example contingent convertible
bonds, will have a more narrowly defined target market[32]. Such products may only
be offered to per se professional or elective professional clients who are likely to understand
the complexities associated with these products. In other words, this means that a wide
variety of products are, from a target market perspective, only available to professional
clients. Second, where an investment firm offers services to professional clients, as end-
clients, several requirements which need to be taken into account by such investment firm
will be significantly different in comparison to product governance arrangements related to
retail clients. In its guidelines, ESMA has acknowledged that for investment products
designed for professional clients as an end client, the overall assessment of the target market
may be less comprehensive compared to the assessment for the retail clients as end-client.
Where an investment firm needs to assess the target market, either in capacity of
manufacturer or distributor, the firm must use the categories defined by ESMA in its
guidelines[33]. The guidelines include factors such as:
 the type of (potential) clients to whom the product is targeted;
































 the financial situation of the (potential) client with a focus on the ability to bear
losses;
 the risk tolerance and compatibility of the risk/reward profile of the product with
the target market; and
 the (potential) client’s objectives and requirements.
The element ‘the type of clients’ to whom the product is targeted refers to the MiFID client
categorization framework, that is, retail clients, professional clients and eligible
counterparties. ESMA acknowledged that MiFID II allows that certain assumptions may be
made about a client’s knowledge and experience with respect to understanding investment
risks. However, it should be noted that there is a difference between professional clients per
se and opted up professional clients. It should not be presumed that clients belonging to the
latter category possess the knowledge and experience of professional clients per se.
Critical analysis of the effectiveness of MiFID provisions
A critical view on a number of MiFID provisions is contained below, where we have
reviewed and commented on a number of eye-catching provisions for professional clients.
Paradigm on knowledge and experience
First, the material differences between a professional and retail client shall be focused on.
This is important, as the spirit of the directive is based on the presumption that the
representative(s) of a professional client has sufficient relevant investment knowledge and
experience. What is legally qualified as ‘sufficient knowledge and experience’ does not have
to be so from a financial-economic perspective. In particular, dealing with risks, where the
risk appetite is of great importance, can be different and lead to other (financial) outcomes.
In economic literature, various studies show that the difference between a professional client
and a retail client can be significant. Venezia et al. (2011) conclude that the difference
between professional and retail clients is mainly because retail clients take their investment
decisions independently and do not leave this to professional managers. Maybe more
distinctively, retail investors suffer, to varying degrees, from behavioral biases like loss
aversion, disposition effect, herd behavior, ostrich effect and hindsight bias (Ofir, and
Wiener, 2016). The tendency of ‘amateur’ investors to exhibit ‘herd behavior’ (investors
imitate the behavior of the other investor and then (partially) ignore their own information
and beliefs) was confirmed previously by Venezia et al. (2011). The researchers attribute this
behavior to a lack of financial and economic training. This behavior causes systematic and
economically large losses, whereas professional investors show outperformance (Barber,
2009). This difference is (again) related to poor investment training which results in limited
diversification of portfolios and poor trading decisions.
The difference in behavior is also reported by Shapira and Venezia (2007). They illustrate
with empirical research that professional investors show more sophisticated behavior than
individual investors. For example, when it comes to distinctive differences in behavior,
earlier research has shown that institutional investors invest less at home (Grinblatt, and
Keloharju, 2001) and are better at taking profits (Shapira, and Venezia, 2001). Menkhoff et al.
(2009) studied two groups of professional investors and compared them with laymen by
means of a survey. They found that institutional investors behave in a more sophisticated
manner than laymen.
The financial crisis has shown, however, that there are limitations to the ability of






























examples (City of Milan, Orange County and Vestia), we have illustrated that knowledge
and experience were assumed to be present with professional clients but were not found to
be material in any way. It is therefore justified to question whether all professional investors
have sufficient, deep-rooted knowledge of markets, characteristics and risks of portfolio
theory and asset allocation to be able to take independent investment decisions. An
investment firm must monitor the financial goals and risk appetite/tolerance of the
professional client but aspects as to the ability to bear losses and knowledge and/or
experience are not considered. This is remarkable because the degree of knowledge and
experience can have a direct impact on risk tolerance. In addition, monitoring risk appetite
does not make much sense if the knowledge and experience of the professional investor is
not taken into account. Usually the impact of investment knowledge/experience in an
investment advice will be marginal, but if there are two different but similar investment
strategies or different risk and/or complexity is being considered, then investment
knowledge and/or experience can have a major impact on the final choice. In conclusion,
effective measures should be sought in risk controls and strong oversight to prevent an
institution or even one person taking high risks for conservative portfolios of municipalities
and local public authorities.
Moreover, with regard to the MiFID classification of professional ‘per se’, it could be
argued that not every per se professional should be treated equally. For example, there is
arguably a difference between a large corporate and an investment firm that deals solely for
its own account. On the one hand, a large corporate is considered to be a professional and,
therefore, able to bear any loss, but persons authorized to act on behalf of the large corporate
may not possess the required knowledge and experience. On the other hand, an investment
firm that deals for its own account may possess the required knowledge and experience but
may not be able to bear all losses which may result from the risky trading activities. The
assumption that a professional investor has sufficient knowledge and/or experience can lead
to undesirable situations. A professional investor with insufficient knowledge and/or
experience, but a high risk appetite and long investment horizon, could make an investment
choice with a high return/risk strategy. It can be, therefore, be concluded that a one-sided
legal distinction between ‘professional’ and ‘retail’ is insufficient. A difference in actual
behavior, investment knowledge and experience entails that a careful selection process is
necessary. In other words, the presumption whether an investor can be deemed to be a
professional investor or not should be tested in one way or another.
10 per cent warning of professional clients
MiFID II contains provisions to provide explicit information and warnings (e.g. 10 per cent
loss reporting). What is the effect of this type of information provision and warnings from a
scientific point of view? Hart ‘t and Loonen (2018) place critical notes to the usefulness and
necessity of such obligations. Is it possible to ensure that the professional client is protected
against his own rashness or lack of insight? Or will these information andwarning efforts be
systematically ignored because of information overload or habituation?
There is cause to challenge whether a correlation between the cautioned and the possible
consequences exists. The requirement to warn professional clients when their investment
portfolio drops by 10 per cent or more seems to contradict the assumption that a
professional client is ‘able to bear financial losses’. Such situations do not appear, therefore,
to apply to professional clients. The professional client is also deemed to have sufficient
knowledge and/or experience to make independent investment decisions. To warn them that
investments may decrease in value should, therefore, be unnecessary. A subsequent
































act. We would suggest making the degree and nature of warning congruent with the actual
knowledge and experience that applies to the professionally classified client.
Cost disclosures
The possibility to limit disclosures on costs and charges within a wholesale chain may seem
logical. On one hand, this relates to the circumstances that a professional client may not
require protection in the same way as the retail client. Cost disclosures may also be
considered to be competitive sensitive information, and presumably, this is the main reason
why professional clients choose to deviate from the costs disclosures obligations. On the
other hand, however, full cost disclosure is the ultimate objective and is no different from
that of a retail client. Costs and charges should be taken into account to enable a client to
consider its investment decision. There is no reason why this should be different for a
professional client. Furthermore, at the same time, the possibility to agree amongst
professional clients not to provide full costs disclosures has an effect ultimately on costs
disclosures where the end client is a retail client. For example, Investment Firm A which
provides order execution services to Investment Firm B that ultimately has a retail client
does not need to disclose certain costs, that is, implicit costs in the bid/ask spread, to
Investment Firm B. Investment Firm B is then not able to disclose such costs to its retail
client. In other words, the contractual freedom for an investment firm that provides services
to a professional client to limit its cost disclosure may create problems or hamper full and
accurate information on costs and charges to retail client further in the chain. In that sense, it
can be advocated that within the professional market, costs disclosures requirements should
be met in full, not to provide investor protection to the professional client, but to achieve full
costs transparency throughout the chain. Moreover, the contractual freedom to deviate from
full costs disclosures indicates that a professional client does not wish to receive full cost
transparency which is not the case.
Concluding observations
The MiFID legislator has attempted to make a distinction between the treatment of
professional clients and retail clients. Where a large degree of protection provisions applies
for a retail client, an attempt has been made to limit these provisions for a professional client.
Although the legislation itself is clear, strong reservations exists concerning the logic of the
provisions andwhether these provisions reflect the spirit of the legislation.
These reservations concentrate on a number of few themes. The first theme being the
unnecessity of gathering specific information as certain aspects are supposed to be present.
This relates not only to knowledge and/or experience, but also to the ability to bear losses.
On one hand, professional clients are assumed to have sufficient knowledge and/or
experience to understand the risks of their (intended) transactions. On the other hand,
information about the risk appetite, investment objective(s) and investment horizon must be
gathered. All of these aspects have a direct correlation to (the extent of) investment
knowledge and/or experience and capacity to bear losses. This introduces the risk that sub-
optimal investment choices are made, whereby ‘legal cover-against-it’ behavior and ‘box-
ticking’ behavior prevails over an appropriate financial and economic investment service.
The difference between professional and retail classification cannot be found in balance
sheet size or number of transactions of (significant) scope, but in demonstrable knowledge,
experience and trading behavior. The explicit and automatic assumption of the presence of
knowledge and experience does not do justice to the findings of academic research that show
that the level of knowledge and experience is decisive for the degree of professionalism. A clear






























Another theme is the warning obligations applicable under MiFID. Specifically, the 10 per
cent threshold warning does not actually serve professional clients. On the other hand, disclosing
costs should not be optional because they serve all clients, regardless of their classification.
While there is no doubt that it is necessary to comply with the rules of conduct to protect
investors for whom it is most necessary, this does not detract from the fact that it is
advisable to calibrate more adequately the requirements applicable to different categories of
clients. The obligations imposed on investment firms in connection with professional clients
create a confounded picture and allow for unnecessary ambiguity and may even result in
damage and liability. In assessing the effectiveness of the MiFID guideline by the EU
Parliament and EU Commission, these findings should be taken into account and should
result in adaptation of the newMiFID guideline accordingly.
Notes
1. ‘Impact assessment accompanying the original proposals for Directive 2014/65/EU and
Regulation (EU)’ (no. 600/2014, p 20-21).
2. For the purpose of this paper, we do not address the ‘eligible counterparty’ under MiFID.
3. Annex II MiFID Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the council of May 15,
2014.
4. Annex II MiFID II.
5. See Annex II MiFID II.
6. Article 56 Assessment of appropriateness and related record-keeping provisions (Article 25(3)
and 25(5) of Directive 2014/65/EU) and Article 54 (3) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2017/565 of April 26, 2016 .
7. See ESMA Final Report Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability requirements of
May 28, 2018, General Guideline 3 Sub 41, Page 42.
8. See ESMA Final Report Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability requirements of
May 28, 2018, General Guideline 3 Sub 41, Page 42 and Article 54 (3) Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016, where the presumption that an investment firm may
assume that the ‘per se professional client is financially able to bear any related investment risks
consistent with its investment objectives only explicitly relates to the service investment advice,
not portfolio management.
9. See Article 54(4) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
10. See Article 54(5) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
11. See Article 24 (3) MiFID II.
12. See also Article 24(14) MiFID II Directive which provides that “The delegated acts referred to in
paragraph 13 shall take into account: (a) the nature of the service(s) offered or provided to the
client or potential client, taking into account the type, object, size and frequency of the
transactions; (b) the nature and range of products being offered or considered including different
types of financial instruments; (c) the retail or professional nature of the client or potential clients
or, in the case of paragraphs 4 and 5, their classification as eligible counterparties.” Or see FCA
Handbook COBS 4.2. where the FCA expressed: “So a communication addressed to a professional
client or an eligible counterparty may not need to include the same information, or be presented
in the same way, as a communication addressed to a retail client”.
13. See Article 24 (4) MiFID II .
































15. See Article 44 (2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
16. See Article 44 (2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
17. See ESMA Final Report ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR
December 19, 2014, ESMA/2014/1569, Pages 100-103.
18. See recital (64) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016:
19. Regulation (EU), no 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 26,
2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment
products (PRIIPs), L 352/1, December 9, 2014.
20. See Article 24 (11) MiFID II Directive 2014/65/EU.
21. See Article 50(1) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
22. See Article 50(2) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
23. See Recital (74) and Article 50 (10) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April
26, 2016.
24. See Article 27(1) MiFID II Directive 2014/65/EU.
25. Idem note 22.
26. See Article 66 (9) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
27. See Article 3 Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/576 of June 8, 2016 supplementing Directive
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical
standards for the annual publication by investment firms of information on the identity of
execution venues and on the quality of execution.
28. See Article 24(1) MiFID II Directive 2014/65/EU.
29. See Article 11(2) Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of April 7, 2016.
30. See Article 12(1) Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of April 7, 2016.
31. See Article 62 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of April 26, 2016.
32. See ESMA “Final Report, Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements” June 2, 2017,
ESMA35-43-62.
33. See ESMA “Final Report, Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements” June 2, 2017,
ESMA35-43-62.
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